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THE UNIVERSITY AND EDUCATION
ABOUT LAW
Charles E. Odegaard*
The thesis of this article is that law is too large and too important a
subject to be left by the university to the law school. To say this is not
to fault the law school which already carries a substantial segment of
instructional responsibility, but rather to fault the university's total
approach to the study of law and all its ramifications, both as a matter
of rational study and as preparation for careers-note, I say careersrelated to the study of law.
From the lawyer's viewpoint, this assertion may well be regarded as
the irrelevant, indeed impertinent, charge of a layman-a layman, it
must be admitted, who has not visited many law schools nor engaged
in a long and toilsome scholarly investigation. It is rather the conclusion reached by a denizen of some 40 years duration of several American universities; a denizen who acquired an enlarging exposure to a
number of academic parts of a university through service, first as dean
of arts and sciences, and then as president of a large and complex research-oriented university. Those experiences led, among other things,
to an interest in comparative practices in professional education. In
the case of law, this concern was whetted by a medieval historian's
interest in the origin of the common law in Norman England. Curiosity about the legal profession recently led to several months' reading
about the history of legal education in the United States which culminated in this article.1
The purpose of this article is not to provide answers but to raise
questions, which lead to other questions, concerning the relationship
between legal and other types of education. Prerequisite to an earnest
effort to answer these questions is analysis and discussion among university faculty who are not now in the habit of engaging in much
common discourse. There is, very simply, a need for more kinds of
scholars to engage in more widespread dialogue and cooperative study
*

Professor of Higher Education and President Emeritus, University of Washing-

ton; B.A., 1932, Dartmouth College; M.A., 1933, Ph.D., 1937, Harvard University.

1. The author wishes to express appreciation to the Stanford Law School for the
many courtesies extended during his use of its library.
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among themselves about law. Changes in academic behavior must
occur, beginning with an end to the isolationist tendencies of the law
school, before the university can properly address itself to the problem
of justice, its definition and implementation in society.
BRIEF HISTORY OF LEGAL EDUCATION: A LEGACY
OF ISOLATIONISM

I.

Almost 200 years have elapsed since legal education first appeared
as a part of organized higher education in the United States. 2 In colonial times, aspiring lawyers prepared for practice by apprenticeship,
serving as clerks under practicing lawyers. 3 Admission to the practice
of law was contingent only upon passing an examination; the colonial
4
colleges played no part in the professional education of lawyers.
Thomas Jefferson was the first to establish instruction about law in
a collegiate setting.5 In 1779 he established a professorship of "Law
and Police" at the College of William and Mary, the first incumbent
being George Wythe, 6 in whose law office Jefferson himself had
learned law. Significantly, Jefferson viewed the teaching at William
and Mary as embracing far more than the legal techniques learned in
apprenticeship in a law office. The student was to have a broader education, law itself being treated as a branch of government. The course
of legal study included constitutional law, political economy and legislation and permitted a student specializing in law to pursue concurrently other university studies.
Similar efforts to establish legal education within a broader frame2.

For the history of legal education in law schools into the 20th century, see A.

[hereinREED, TRAINING FOR THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 107-420 (1921)
after cited as REED], and a briefer sketch in A. HARNO. LEGAL EDUCATION IN THE
UNITED STATES (1953) [hereinafter cited as HARNO]. The so-called Carrington Report
to the Association of American Law Schools. ASS'N AM. L. SCHOOLS, PROCEEDINGS, pt.
1, § II (P. Carrington ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS], includes appendices
of significance for the history of legal education: Reed, Training for tile Public Profession of the Law (K. Wallach abr.), in id. at 74; Stolz, Trainingfor tile Public Profession of the Law (1921): A Contemporary Review, in PROCEEDINGS at 142; Currie, Tile
Materials of Law Study (A. Cullison abr.), in PROCEEDINGS at 184; Mazor. Tie Materials of law Study: 1971, in PROCEEDINGS at 240. The Carrington Report with its
four appendices is reprinted in H. PACKER & T. EHRLICH, NEW DIRECTIONS IN LEGAL
EDUCATION 95-328 (1972) [hereinafter cited as PACKER & EHRLICH].
3.
HARNoat 19.
4. REED at 112-15.

5.
6.
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work were attempted in a number of colleges up to the 1820's.7 Presumably, students who had studied about law in such curriculums
would obtain a broader perspective of the social scene. With this
background the students could then enter upon a clerkship in a law
office and thus prepare for the bar and the practice of law.
These opportunities for a broad study of law were doomed to be
overtaken by a narrower technical course of instruction of law essentially divorced from other subject matter. The precedent for more
technical study of law was set by Tapping Reeve, who established in
Litchfield, Connecticut in 1784 a school of law divorced from any
collegiate setting, there being no college in Litchfield.8 Reeve organized a systematic course of daily lectures. Students were required to
carefully compile lecture notes, do additional reading and take an
examination every Saturday on the past week's work. These requirements were supplemented in time by optional moot court and debates.9
In 1829, Joseph Story reorganized the Harvard Law School,' 0
which had been established in 1816,11 into a variant of the Litchfield
model. No prior college study was required 12 to pursue the narrow
professional course in which politics, legislation and international law
were excluded in favor of the growing judge-made law.' 3 Story's lead
was followed by an increasing number of colleges which throughout
the 19th century took steps to affiliate with the college a law school
providing instruction by lawyer-teachers of students aspiring to become practicing lawyers,' 4 although there lingered attempts, particularly in the South, to include instruction about law within the college
curriculum. But these were the exceptions.' 5 Law for lawyers was
generally perceived as a self-contained subject to be taught separately
in law schools, although often affiliated with colleges. Minimal contact between the college and the law school, both with regard to the
law faculty and the law students, became the rule. Of course, a student might choose, as did Jefferson, to attend the college before un-

7. HARNO at 24.
8. REED at 129.
9. Id.at 131.
10. Id.at 142.
11. Id. at 137.
12. Id. at 145.
13. Id. at 146-47.
14. Id.at 151-54.

15.

Id.
at 155, 157.
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dertaking the study of law. Toward the end of the 19th century, Harvard Law School required attendance at a college before entering law
school. Once admitted to the law school, however, the student was
immersed in the business of the law, leaving all contact with the college behind. The requirement of prior attendance became universal
among law schools in the 20th century though variations in the
length of attendance at a college were and are still allowed among the
16
law schools.
Although the original practical, descriptive, study of law has been
replaced by a more theoretical approach,' 7 this change in approach
has not led to the conclusion that any particular body of knowledge
outside legal traditions and materials is "basic" to the study of law.
Lawyers have been repeatedly instructed that they must learn to think,
not just like anyone else, as IBM ubiquitously advocates, but to
"think like lawyers"-to develop the legal mind. 18 The ideology for
determining the subject matter of such thinking and the methodology
for teaching it to law students was provided by Dean Christopher
Columbus Langdell at Harvard Law School. By the end of the 19th
century, Harvard became the model emulated by other university law
schools, 19 and, whatever breaches have been made in the system, the
isolation of the law school in the university environment remains as its
particular distinguishing feature. As that peripatetic lawyer-professor,
David Riesman, who has taught both in law schools and in the social
sciences, notes: "[I] n most universities, the law schools have remained autarchic, sharing only the most nominal connections with
20
undergraduate and graduate education in the arts and sciences.
16.

See generally REED.

17. Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell originated the "case method" of law
study. i.e., the extraction of legal principles from appellate court opinions. Moreover.
"instead of merely lecturing to his students upon these cases, he insisted that the
students should do hard work, preparing themselves beforehand to discuss them by
the Socratic method." REED at 378 (footnote omitted).
18. See PACKER & EHRICH at 30. The case method has lately come under attack
for its psychological impact on the student. Stevens, Two Cheers for 1870: The
American Law School, in 5 PERSPECTIVES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 403, 537 (Fleming &

Bailyn eds. 1971). Ralph Nader's view is representative: "Law professors take delight
in crushing egos in order to acculturate the students to what they call 'legal reasoning,'
or 'thinking like a lawyer.' The process is a highly sophisticated form of mind control
that trades off breadth of vision and factual inquiry for freedom to roam in an intellectual cage." Nader, Crumbling of the Old Order: Law Schools and Law Firms, New
Repuiblic, Nov. 15, 1969, p. 20, quoted, id. at 537 n.129.
19.
REEDat380-81.
20.
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A long conservative history then has kept the law school separate
from the arts and sciences and the rest of the university, and indeed
has kept the rest of the university separated from the law school-to
21
their mutual disadvantage.
II.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF LAW SCHOOL ISOLATION:
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ASPECTS

Despite individual exceptions and some efforts at reform, law
school faculty and students have achieved a splendid isolation exceeding that of any other segment of the American university. This
isolation of the law school inevitably has consequences for two quite
different, if related, aspects of law. Both deserve attention. One aspect
relates to the "theory" about the law, its nature, its purpose, its
sources and its sanctions. The other aspect relates to practical matters
whose connections with the first may seem remote. This aspect concerns the operational level of lawyers dealing with matters in contention between private individuals or with forms of individual behavior
regarded as criminal. Here we find ourselves in the arena which is
perceived directly as the evolving practice of law, the provision of
legal services.
A.

The TheoreticalAspect

It is amazing how much of American legal education in the past 100
years has been based on implicit assumptions and how little attention
has been paid in this period to jurisprudence and government, and to
the philosophical, historical and comparative study of law. These

21.

It is not the intent here to analyze all of the causes of perpetuation of this

separation. However, one cause deserving attention is the pattern of financial support
of law schools. Although they may or may not have been expected to be a source of
profit to the harboring college or university, there certainly has been an expectation,

and may still be an expectation in some universities, that they will pay their own way
essentially through tuition fees. This expectation has affected law school teaching, by
limiting curricular offerings and causing high faculty-student ratios. But "tubs expected to sit on their own bottoms" understandably develop an attitude of independence
which is not conducive to increased conversation and cooperation with other parts of
the university. PACKER & EHRLICH at 63-76. These underlying fiscal and psychological
conditions constitute not so subtle barriers to the interchange of faculty and students
with other faculties of a university.
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"borderland" 22 subjects, have skittered around the edges but have not
been central to education in the law. Although there were attempts in
the late 18th and first half of the 19th centuries to inject larger
perspectives into legal education, these attempts were crushed by the
success of Langdell's Harvard Law School. "Non-legal" materials
were excluded in favor of Langdell's dogma of the "inductive science"
of law based on the decisions of appellate courts. 23 Later attempts at
Columbia 2 4 and Yale 25 to include such things as political science,
nature and history of law, jurisprudence and Roman law were abortive and died out.
Writing in the 1950's, Brainerd Currie described the effort of the
Columbia law faculty in the late 1920's as the most notable attempt of
a law school to challenge the reigning orthodoxy. He regarded it as
part of "the movement .. .which has been calling for reorganization

of the law curriculum along 'functional' lines and for the broadening
of law school studies to include non-legal materials, drawn principally
from the social sciences."126 Twenty years later, Lester J. Mazor noted
that the movement described by Currie still has adherents, as evidenced by the theme chosen for the 1969 meeting of the Association
of American Law Schools, "Social Research and the Law." 2 7 Its delib-

erations included a call to establish closer relations with the rest of the
educational world. Yet, Mazor's review of interdisciplinary relationships between law school and other faculties led him to conclude that
"many lawyers and law teachers remain highly skeptical of the im28
portance of interdisciplinary activity in the life of the law school."
Moreover, Jerome Carlin, holder of both a law degree and a Ph.D. in
sociology, has argued that social science has not proven an alternative
to the growing sense of sterility in the conventional approach to the
teaching of law and legal doctrine. Carlin concludes that interdisciplinary activity is a needless expense when the prime need is for per29
sons trained to provide legal services.
22. REED at 277.
23. For an historical sketch of general education and legal study, see Currie. The
Materials of Law Study, 3 J. LEG. ED. 331 (1951).
24. Id. at 332.
25. Id. at 381-82.
26. Id. at 332.
27. See Mazor, The Materials of Law Sttudy: 1971, in PACKER & EHRLICH at 319.
28. Id. at 327.
29. Id. Professors Packer and Ehrlich observe:
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Herbert Packer and Thomas Ehrlich, in their 1972 report on new
directions in legal education, touch on the relationship of law and
other disciplines, the interdisciplinary idea, only to trounce it:30
The much heralded marriage of law and the behavioral sciences has
not yet taken place, despite the encouraging noises that sone enthusiasts have been making. On the whole, we are not disappointed that the
courtship has not resulted in a permanent union. Scholarship in the
law has, it is true, not achieved the quantitative precision that is characteristic of such disciplines as economics or psychology. While scholarship about law is not as precise, neither is it trivial. The worst aspects of journeyman work in the behavioral sciences-triviality and
irrelevance-are reflected, in our opinion, in the headlock that the
Ph.D. puts on higher education. We are delighted that legal scholarship has so far escaped this headlock.
Even so, legal education apparently has its own problems, for as
Packer and Ehrlich suggest, law students and professors alike are confused and suffer from malaise.3 1 Packer and Ehrlich explain: "We believe secularizationto be the prime intellectual cause of the contemporary malaise in legal education. ' 32 In a thumbnail sketch, the authors
describe how the legal realists in the 1920-1940 period initiated a
rebellion against the Langdellian inductive science of law. This "rebellion" sought to structure law as a technological study that could be
wedded to the behavioral sciences. According to Packer and Ehrlich:
Many people, enchanted by what they conceive to be the rigor of the behavioral
sciences, have sought to wed them to such emerging specialties as urban law,
poverty law, correctional law, and (most recently) environmental law. Others,
perhaps "turned off' by what they see as the tendency of the behavioral sciences to
work for rigorous solutions to trivial problems, see law as a humanistic subject
and tend to turn their interests to such fields as history and philosophy, seeking
through them better insights into the role of law. This group of humanists, if group
is the right word, probably represents a minority among serious legal scholars.
PACKER & EHRLICH at 33.
30. Id. at 57 (footnote omitted).
31. Id. at 34. Professor Charles J. Meyers, Chairman of the Committee on
Curriculum of the Association of American Law Schools, echoed a similar conclusion
in a 1968 report:
[T] he Committee has come to believe that legal education is in a crises [sic] and
that fundamental changes must be made soon. It is not only that law students
over the country are reaching the point of open revolt but also that law faculties
themselves particularly the younger members, share with the students the view
that legal education is too rigid, too uniform, too narrow, too repetitious and too
long.
Ass'N AM. L. SCHOOLS, PROCEEDINGS, pt. 1, § II, at 7 (1968).

32.

PACKER & EHRLICH at 34 (emphasis in original).
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"Legal education today stands somewhere between the social engineering that the Realists viewed as its proper role and an as yet undefined preoccupation with social policy. . . .The lack of consensus
33
about social policy causes the malaise of which we have spoken."
Believing "that it is time for legal education to pay more attention to a
broader and more philosophic inquiry into the law," 34 they con35
clude:
[S] ecularization has led to much muddled thinking about the law. The
rational study of values, or ends, has been viewed as off limits to most
scholars.... The rational study of ends, which is to say of values, is a
very difficult enterprise. Yet it is essential that scholars begin to make
an effort to study the means/ends interaction of the problems in which
they are interested. No discipline more than law incites scholars to
make this effort.
In their analysis, Packer and Ehrlich were obviously influenced by
Calvin Woodard's article, The Limits of Legal Realism: An Historical
Perspective.3 6 Woodard's article is of first rate importance. It paints
on a large canvas the steps in, and consequences of, the secularization
of law and thinking about law. By secularization, Woodard means
three interrelated characteristics of Western thought in the last four
centuries: a distinctive way of looking at man's environment-rationalism; the development of systematic procedures to exploit this rationalistic perception so as to produce new knowledge about the worldscientific method; and the development of techniques by which scientific knowledge can be adapted to the practical needs of man and society-technology.3 7 This process of secularization of law, Woodard
notes, has led to the current frustration about legal education and the
presence of considerable discontent among law students, professors
and alumni, even though the majority probably believe there is
nothing wrong with legal education as presently constituted.
Woodard calls attention to one of the negative aspects of secularization, the presence of an inner conflict. He states: "Secularization
thus torments the souls of men while it gratifies their minds." 38 In this
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
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Id. at 35.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 55.
54 VA. L. REV. 689 (1968), reprinted in
Id. at 690-91.
Id. at 734.

PACKER

& ERLICH at 33 1.
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era of Watergate revelations replete with clean-cut, presumably welleducated, bright young lawyers (and not-so-young lawyers) in leading
39
roles, Woodard's pre-Watergate analysis is instructive:
The current manifestation of this inner conflict is a paradoxical loss
of respect for "legality" as a social sanction at the very time that the
law, because of its humanitarian and egalitarian aims, deserves great
esteem. Modem man, no longer sub deo et sub legi, feels himself morally free of the demands of externally imposed law that clash with his
innermost convictions. Predictably, the result is a generation of law
teachers who find it difficult to believe- by this I mean profoundly
believe-in the existence of law beyond what fallible courts say it is; a
generation of law students who consequently do not learn to be restrained in any essential way by the law; and a generation of laymen
who are markedly uninhibited by, and indeed contemptuous of, the
sanctions of law. The appeal to a "Rule of Law" under such circumstances is rather pathetic and almost hopeless.
Woodard notes that at one time religion provided a buttress, a
sanction for law, but the sanction from religion has evaporated.
40
Hence:
It simply means that a greater burden falls upon law, or the sanction of law, to preserve peace and harmony among men. For law is the
most reasonable (or reasoned) of all societal sanctions. In a secularized world, society must rely more heavily upon it than upon religion.
This is the challenge to legal education.
What action should be taken? Woodard suggests that "justice, in a
42
word, must take precedence over law."4 1 He continues optimistically:
Now, as a result of fifty years of social scientific research, we have for
the first time a body of knowledge on virtually all subjects. And this
knowledge, properly used, gives us power to deal with complex social
problems in ways simply unknown to the past.
What we require now is access to all this knowledge. We need a
force capable of organizing the several social sciences into a single
comprehensive body of knowledge.
In medieval universities theology was the queen of the sciences. In
the modern university such unity is lacking, but justice is sought. The
39.
40.
41.

Id.
Id. at 736.
Id. at 737.

42.

Id. at 738.
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logical heir to theology in the multiversity is Law-The Queen of the
Social Sciences.
43
Woodard concludes his vision:

How they [law and economics, law and sociology, law and political
science, law and psychology, law and all the other social sciences] are
to be reunited is of course the question. It does not matter that as law
teachers we do not yet have a satisfactory answer to this question. As
law teachers we can insure at least that lawyers will answer it-lawyers who are educated to be agents of justice and make of their subject
what theology was to Newman's Ideal of the University.
It is not then only legal education, but the law itself which is suffering from malaise, the loss of "legality," the loss of sanction in our
society, so that the sanctions placed behind those detailed rules and
regulations, which have been so much the object of the lawyer's
preoccupation, are of less force and effect. If legal education and the
law itself are to be reinvigorated, lawyers must become students of
social policy, of justice raised to the eminence of the capstone of the
multiversity. It is submitted that these worthy objectives may more
readily be approached by lawyers as allies of colleagues elsewhere in
the university-social scientists and humanists, branded though they
may be by the Ph.D. If the pursuit of the law is to lead to social policy
and justice, it might be well to try a university-wide approach and not
to retreat to a purely law school approach which has been marked for
50 years by hesitant advance and impeded, as Woodard notes, by the
cult of the "legal mind," the baggage of the case book, and the Socratic method of instruction derived from the Langdellian ultra-induc44
tive science of law.
B.

The PracticalAspect

1.

Paraprofessionaland specialist training

Concern for theory of law leads then to awareness of a problem of
enormous importance for society, the question of the survival of the

43.

Id. at 739. For a discussion of Newman's Ideal of the University, see J. NEWMAN.

THE IDEA OF A UNIVERSITY (1852).

44.
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"reign of law" itself. But awareness of serious concerns about the
functioning of law in our society can also emerge by starting far from
this floating world of theory. Discontent is also evident at the level of
practice of the law, the second aspect affected by the isolationist tendencies of legal education. Packer and Ehrlich provide a pointed summary of everyday problems in legal practice when they assert: "There
is a quiet crisis in the availability of legal services. ''4 5 As they note,
there is an emerging concept of legal indigence, something like medical indigence. 4 6 The Office of Economic Opportunity has highlighted
poor people's needs for legal services, not only in criminal but also in
civil areas.4 7 There are demands for new forms of service, comprehensive prepaid legal assistance and group legal services. All these pressures raise questions as to the organization of legal services and, to
adopt terminology now used for health, questions as to the definition
of roles of persons working within an evolving legal delivery system.
One wonders whether the crisis in the availability of legal services can
any longer be called "quiet" when in 1974 a United States Senate subcommittee, for the first time in the history of Congress, began hearings
48
on the availability of legal services to citizens.
The recent demands for improved quality and availability of legal
services have led to proposals for recognition of the increased diversity among those providing legal services, both among lawyers and
between lawyers and various types of law-related paraprofessionals
and subprofessionals. Packer and Ehrlich conclude that "certification

45.

PACKER & EHRLICH at 5.

46. Id. at 6.
47. Id. at 16.
48. Senator John V. Tunney chaired the Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Representation of Citizen Interests, which recently published several pertinent hearings. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen
Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., ORGANIZED BAR:
SELF-SERVING OR SERVING THE PUBLIC? (1974); Hearings Before the Subcomm. on

Consumers of the Senate Commerce Comm. & Subcomm. on Representation of Citizen
Interests of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., CONSUMER
CONTROVERSIES (1974). The Subcommittee also published a report, written by Dean
Thomas Ehrlich of the Stanford Law School and Dean Murray L. Schwartz of
the UCLA Law School. STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON REPRESENTATION OF CITIZEN INTERESTS
OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., REDUCING THE COSTS OF
LEGAL SERVICES: POSSIBLE APPROACHES BY THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Comm. Print

1974). Senator Tunney delivered a number of speeches, to bar associations and
similar groups, presenting his critical evaluation of the availability and quality of
legal services derived from his conclusions from the Senate hearings. See, e.g., text

accompanying note 66 infra.
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of specialists... cannot be long delayed, however strong a rear guard
action the 'organized' bar maintains." 49 They assert that this realization is already a fact in the sense that many lawyers restrict the area of
their practice, either by client, locale, fields of legal doctrine, tasks or
institutional setting. 50 Generally, law students are trained in some
basic fundamentals only.5 1 "[A] s a result, the law school graduate is
not competent to do anything very well."152 Practicing lawyers learn by
experience, and, since such experience is always limited, a lawyer is
competent only in a few areas. "As a result, specialists and paraprofes53
sionals do their work better."
Legal paraprofessionals, trained in a specific area, are already
available to provide tax advice, draft real estate documents, probate
wills, investigate facts and settle insurance claims. 54 While paraprofessionals incur the wrath of the Bar and are resisted or coexist under
"treaties" as with accountancy, banks, real estate and insurance, proponents of publicly supported legal services and private practitioners
in large urban firms are exerting pressure for more paraprofessionals
55
and subprofessionals.
Packer and Ehrlich maintain that law schools, now teaching little
substance and even less "how to do it," are not geared to contribute
much to specialization in law. It would appear that a program of continuing education organized by the Bar, perhaps with some assistance
from law professors, is better suited to make this contribution. 5 6 As
for paraprofessionals, most of their training can be left to community
colleges, though perhaps qualification as a legal administrator should

49. PACKER & EHRLICH at 8. It should be noted that California recently amended
its legal practice regulations to provide for a limited number of specialists in the fields
of criminal law, workmen's compensation and taxation. Pilot projects are now being
conducted in specialization, and specialists who become certified may be so listed in
telephone and other directories. Other states may follow. Certification for specialization
in medicine is achieved by passing of examinations set by national speciality boards
voluntarily organized by the profession without state involvement.
50. Id. at 10-1I. The most controversial aspects about certification of specialists
involve professional competition and the ban against advertising. Physicians are permitted to indicate their areas of specialization in the yellow pages of telephone books
and other directories; lawyers cannot do so.
51. Id. at 20.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.at 15.
55. Id.at 15, 16.
56. Id.at 14-15.
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require a 4-year course. In sum, it would appear that the isolated law
faculty alone will have a difficult time adjusting to a new role in relation to either paraprofessional or specialist legal education.5 7
2.

Educationfor governmental roles

In addition to the educational problems posed by paraprofessionals
and specialists, it is astonishing that law schools have also shown such
little interest in training persons for roles in government closely related to law. When Thomas Jefferson took the initiative to establish at
the College of William and Mary a professorship in Law and Police,
he had in mind by "Police" something closer to what may be called
polity or policy and was certainly interested more in politics and
legislation than in judge-made law. 58 But legal education, despite
the increased attention to administrative agencies in government, is
still largely oriented toward judge-made law. Other faculties in universities have talked increasingly about political science, the functioning of government, legislatures and administrative agencies, local
governments, penal systems and public administration. They have
addressed the problem of training public servants, many of whose
functions relate closely to administration of the law. In recent years,
schools of public affairs have devoted attention to the formulation of
public or social policy as a practical matter and have developed internships in legislative and executive branches at various levels of
government so that their students can find ways to blend theory and
practice. Governmental administrators, so much of whose time and
thought is devoted to social regulation in ever-increasing areas of our
lives, must be involved with lawyers in their daily rounds. The interrelationship between law and government indicates that educators
within those areas should be in intellectual communication with each
other. Likewise, in the development of the ultimate "team" required
for the provision of legal services as contemplated by Packer and Ehrlich, there is an obvious need for collaboration between different
schools of the university and between the university and other kinds of
educational institutions, including community colleges.

57.
58.

Id. at 19.
REEDat116-17.
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JUSTICE AS A CAPSTONE OF THE MULTIVERSITY:
A PROPOSAL

Whether one starts then from a consideration of the theory of law
or from a concern for the practical delivery of legal services, one is
forced to conclude that it is time to look at law and legal education
from a university perspective. If, for reasons derived from a consideration of theory as well as practice, there is needed an imaginative use
of all potential university resources for a better understanding of the
nature of law and for an improved educational program for the delivery of legal services, what should be done? I doubt that anyone can
come forward now with "the grand design" or with the designation of
any discipline which provides the "open sesame" needed.
No one could accuse Calvin Woodard of aiming low in enunciating
a noble ideal. After recognizing that in medieval universities theology
was the queen of the sciences, he admits that such unity is lacking in
the modem university, but affirms that "justice is sought" and that
"[t] he logical heir to theology in the multiversity is Law-the Queen
59
of the Social Sciences."
Justice as a queen, a capstone for the multiversity! As pretentious
and vague as this may sound, perhaps it is not so preposterous to suggest that the university address itself to the problem of justice, its definition and its implementation in society. It is no more preposterous
than the university's now commonly acknowledged dedication to
teaching and research in many disciplines and professions about
"health," about health as a societal and an individual goal, and about
the means of achieving it. Medicine as a professional school has been
swept from an earlier isolated, merely affiliated relationship to the
university comparable to that still characteristic of the law, into participation in a broad university concern for health. Medicine is now
part of a complex system within which function a variety of special
purpose institutions and a variety of old and new health professions,
paraprofessions, and allied health professionals and technicians. These
institutions and these players of different roles are attempting to determine how to interact with one another in some kind of harmonious
and successful orchestration called the health care system. Of course
growing pains are the order of the day. There are conflicts among the
59.
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guilds, and gaps and discontinuities still exist among the health-related
institutions. There is nonetheless a mounting conviction that a complex health care system is needed, and that steps can and should be
taken which will provide more comprehensive health care for more
people. Such a system would positively encourage health, diminish if
not prevent disease and remedy it as often as possible when and if it
does occur.
The university is by no means the only institution in society concerned with health and the development of an improved health care
system, but it is placed at a very critical juncture in our society for
contributing to the evolution of such a system. It is expected to provide research and inventions for an emerging health care system, and
to recruit and educate an increasing variety of skilled persons required
to fill roles in that system. To paraphrase Woodard, health takes precedence over medicine. In the university this is symbolized by the now
common administrative mobilization of university resources for health
under a vice president for health sciences or health affairs, however
inadequate even this designation may be to cover all the university's
activity related to instruction and research about health.
In light of what universities are already doing to confront and coordinate an enormous array of activities related to health, it does not
seem foolish to urge that universities endeavor to approach justice in a
similar manner. While related bits and pieces of such a unified approach can be found on most campuses, the self-contained guilds still
have little contact with one another. Scholars in universities concerned
with the study of law and justice should combine forces and return to
the drawing board. A suggestive, if partial, list of agenda items is proposed for their consideration:
1. Justice implies an ordered, regulated relationship among individuals with their rights defined under what is often summed up
as "the reign of law." Why have a reign of law? What are its philosophical justifications and what are its historical origins and its
historic legacies now? What are the sanctions for acceptance of a
reign of laws, sacred or secular? What are the resulting imperatives for individuals, the ethical implications? Can the goal of
justice be entertained without the acceptance of some kind of
reign of law?
2. The search for justice has produced a body of experts
known as members of the legal profession. Is it a unitary profes-
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sion, or is it, or should it be, divided into specialists? Is there a
place for paralegal assistants? Have pieces of work of the profession been subtracted already by other expert groups? How should
the work be organized?
3. Courts and judges are parts of the legal system. What
changes or improvements should be made to achieve better justice
through their operations?
4. The "reign of law" presumes continuing lawmaking, promulgation of regulations and effort in both substantive and procedural aspects by legislative and regulatory bodies. How can they
be made more effective?
5. The "reign of law" embraces the idea that when the law is
"broken" some form of punishment will follow, whether the infraction is regarded as against all men as in crimes or against the
rights only of an individual as in civil actions. What is the nature
of our penal actions and penal institutions? Are they remedial
and preventive as well as punitive? What can be learned about the
psychological and sociological aspects of the punitive actions of
a legal system?
6. Law enforcement requires the services of police as investigators and enforcers with special authority and special responsibility. What can be done to improve both the preventive as well
as enforcement aspects of their work?
7. Inquiry is necessary regarding the organization of the delivery system for legal services needed by individuals living in a
society presumably aspiring to justice. Are legal services accessible
and available to all segments of society or only some? Are they
well organized and efficient as to cost? If not, how should the delivery system be modified?
8. The system of justice requires participation by many individuals who play related, if different, roles. How should these individuals be educated to carry out their rights and responsibilities?
What efforts should be made to encourage related participants in
the system to see their relationship to others as well as to those
within their own guilds?
9. How should universities organize themselves to use more
effectively the diverse intellectual and teaching resources needed
for a complex justice delivery system?
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Law teachers do not yet have a satisfactory answer to the questions
of how to bring all the social sciences to bear on law. But Woodard
appears confident that "as law teachers we can at least insure that
lawyers will answer it-lawyers who are educated to be agents of justice and make of their subject what theology was to Newman's Ideal
of the University. '60 If law teachers alone are to answer it, they will
have to add many new dimensions to their subject matter. It may indeed be asking too much to expect them to bear the full burden, especially since like any professional faculty they cannot move too rapidly
to change the pattern of instruction from the perspectives and more
limited interests of the legal profession which employs their graduates.
A sharing of the burden with others in the university faculties, who are
already students of various matters related to justice in society, seems
a more obvious and efficient course. Input is needed from diverse
sources-from all those affected by the law-to adequately address
the agenda noted.
It should be emphasized that contributions to learning may flow in
both directions, not only from non-lawyers to lawyers but also from
lawyers to non-lawyers. Professor Paul Freund wrote in 1953:61
Should the student, whose preparation for mature living must include a study of Boyle's law of gases, be left unexposed to Pound's
Spirit of the Common Law and Cardozo's Nature of the Judicial
Process? . . . [A] university overlooks a rich educational experience
when it fails to offer instruction in legal thinking as part of general
education.
He returned to this theme in 1963:62
[L] aw is probably the most neglected phase of our culture in the liberal arts curriculum. Yet the legal profession, no less than the scientific, functions in a lay society that does, and should, judge its performance. If this judgment is to be effective, it must be based on
knowledge of the role and character of its thinking. General education

60. Id. at 739.
61. Freund, Law and the Universities, 1953 WASH. U.L.Q. 367, 368, 379 (1953).
See also Lader, Experiments in Undergraduate Legal Education: The Teaching of
Law in the Liberal Arts Curriculum of American Collegesand Universities,25 J. LEGAL
ED. 125 (1973).
62. Freund, The Legal Profession, 92 DAEDALUS 689, 700 (1963).
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requires that somehow a view from the inside should be provided of
this profession as of other learned disciplines.
Despite the wisdom of Professor Freund's remarks, and the efforts

of Professor Harold J. Berman and likeminded colleagues elsewhere
to introduce law to the liberal arts course, 63 a 1973 review of these
64
efforts in the past two decades concludes:
Despite this extensive discussion, law has not yet been established
in the liberal arts curriculum of American education. An experimental
character is reflected by the extent and nature of college law teaching.
The most recent survey reveals that no more than about 150 "broadly
based and liberally oriented survey courses about law" are now being
offered at the 2,600 colleges and universities in the United States and
the courses vary widely.

It would appear that the cause of this omission is not only the law
professor's indifference to the college but also the hostility of liberal

arts professors to the law profession and to the legal mind and
process.
IV.

65

RAISING JUSTICE TO THE CAPSTONE

Changes in academic behavior must occur before the highly diverse
university faculties will coordinate their efforts in new intellectual relationships in order to increase learning about justice in society. Truth
is all too often pursued in the modern university by a divided host.
Territoriality does exist in academe, creating invisible but nonetheless

effective walls to communication that sometimes seem insurmount-

63. Professor Berman of the Harvard Law School was a prime mover in efforts
in the 1950's and 1960's to encourage the development of courses about law for college
undergraduates. See Lader, supra note 61. at 133-45.
64. Id. at 145 (footnote omitted).
65. Lader states:
The explanation for this relative dearth of general law courses still lies partly
in the traditional separation of law from liberal arts. One recent law school proponent of an undergraduate law program frankly reported that he encountered
"reluctance, if not obstinancy" on the part of his university's liberal arts college
and cited "finances, personnel, and even personal prejudices" as the source of this
difficulty. Universities, furthermore, have not made a corporate effort to cultivate
in the law schools an interest in teaching law in the college. More important.
perhaps, to the expansion of course offerings is some consensus on the objectives
and nature of undergraduate legal education.
Id. at 145 (footnote omitted).
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able. To bring about change some kind of catalytic pressure is needed.
In analyses of law school curriculums, little use has been made of
outside critics or participants. The tight little island of the law school
has not welcomed strangers. Nonetheless, adventuresome law faculties
might experiment with obtaining the comments of outsiders whose
very ignorance of law may bring to light the existence of assumptions
hidden from the legal cognoscenti. The author's experience indicates
that other professional schools are more exposed to, and more disposed to be involved in, critiques by outsiders. Medicine has joined
the university in live, intellectual contact with other faculties, professions and disciplines, beginning with its adoption of the "basic sciences" portion of its curriculum. Medicine is now developing more
interrelationships with other health professional schools, despite rivalries and conflicts, and with other university disciplines. By working
with engineers, it finds engineering applications to assist in diagnosis
and therapy. By working with social scientists, it slowly enlarges its
perspective beyond the cell and man as a biological organism to see
the whole individual functioning in society. Contacts are now being
made with humanists as awareness grows of ethical issues in medicine.
Medicine is surely a monumentally complex and difficult subject, but
today it is less a mystery known only to its own high priests, as professors of other professions and disciplines share in the study of health
problems. An increasing number of advances in health are attributable
to joint ventures among university faculty who some years ago would
have been intellectual strangers.
Justice, too, can and should be more of a capstone in the university
than it is presently. It will not be so, however, without a new burst of
imagination and energy from some faculty members who resist the
conservative forces which in the past have discouraged more widespread dialogue and cooperative study about justice and its institutions. It is to be hoped they may come from within the university,
from the law school as well as from other faculties.
But the energy source for change may, perhaps, only be found outside the university, just as outside pressure has spurred new perspectives in health care. Doctors have patients; patients are customers.
Customers have certainly had something to say in recent years about
health care; their voices have become more articulate and powerful
through the development of private and governmental third parties
involved in the payments received by the doctors for caring for their
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no-so-patient customers. This outside pressure has certainly encouraged the widening of the university's attention to health.
Lawyers have clients. Clients are customers and the customers are
speaking out about legal services. Indeed, as Senator John V. Tunney
has stated: "Today, the medical profession's stale pleas for voluntarism fall on deaf ears in Congress. And when health becomes a federally-guaranteed right, can justice lag far behind?" 66 As the pressure
mounts from public complaints about the availability and cost of legal
services, the whole context for consideration of law in universities
may be forced to shift.
Whatever may be the actual consequences of such external pressure, is it not time for universities to take a new look at how they
study and how they teach about law and the pursuit of justice in our
society? Is it not time for law schools in particular to initiate bold new
departures within their own confines as well as within the university at
large? Some law teachers like Packer, Ehrlich and Woodard have
voiced great expectations for their colleagues. Maybe law teachers will
provide the leadership needed. The opportunity is there for the taking
by law faculty as well as members of other faculties. 6 7 Carpe diem.
66. Address by Senator John V. Tunney, before Philadelphia Bar Association,
October 3, 1974, copy on file with author.
67. Upon completion of this article, the author's attention was directed by Dean
Robert S. Hunt of the University of Washington Law School to an essay of Professor
Robert Stevens, Two Cheersfor 1870: The American Law School, in 5 PERSPECTIVES
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 403 (Fleming & Bailyn eds. 1971). This is the most thorough

review of the history of legal education and of American law schools; it updates REED
by 50 years. It does not alter the tenor of the brief references to the history of law
schools in this article.
From Stevens' article, one can conclude about the American law school that plus
qa change, plus c'est la mime chose. His narrative provides yet another instance in
support of Santayana's adage that those who cannot remember the past are condemned
to repeat it.
The sardonic "Two Cheers for 1870" in the title of Stevens' article underscores his
pessimism about the possibility of changing the crusty conservatism of the law schools.
He states:
Even if money, lack of interest in scholarship, and unclear purposes of the law
school were not enough to deter any would-be reformer, there were other reasons
which made fundamental changes in the law school impossible. Perhaps most important was egalitarianism and entrenchment within law school faculties ....
Id. at 541 (footnote omitted). To his quotes with reference to the latter point could
be added this writer's observation to his law professor colleagues that the last refuge
of Swiss cantonal democracy in American academe is in the law school where each
member comes to the faculty meeting with rifle in hand.
A reading of Stevens discourages one from hoping that leadership for change, in
the agenda of discussion about justice and law, which should occur within the university will come from law faculties. In the current academic mythology which so
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largely passes for the history of higher education in the United States, we are told
that the age of the giants is over, so that there is no reason to look for influential
initiatives h la President Eliot from latter day pygmy presidents. There does remain,
however, the possibility of pressure from the public whom the professions are supposed
to serve. Speaking of the Bar in Virginia at the time of the American Revolution,
Stevens states: "The situation was sufficiently 'developed' for the inherent conflict in
professionalism between self-interest and the public interest to become potent." Id. at
408. There is mounting public awareness of possible conflict of interest in the legal
services available to it. See note 48 supra. Outside pressure is not likely to fade soon.
The Senate Judiciary Committee, in February 1975, named Senator John V. Tunney
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. The Subcommittee on
Representation of Citizen Interests previously chaired by Senator Tunney is to be
disbanded, but its mandate-including the first Senate investigation into the adequacy
of legal representation for all Americans-will be absorbed into the Subcommittee
on Constitutional Rights. J. Tunney, Memorandum: Merger Between Subcommittee
on Representation of Citizen Interests and Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights,
Feb. 19, 1975 (Memo. from Chairman, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm.
on Representation of Citizen Interests). It is to be hoped that the response of the
university, including the law school, in the face of such public questioning will be
more than lethargy or mere reaction.
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